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In Borrowdale v Director General of Health [2020] NZHC 2090, a full bench of the High 
Court issued the following declaration (at [292]): 
By various public and widely publicised announcements made between 
26 March and 3 April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 public health 
crisis, members of the executive branch of the New Zealand Government 
stated or implied that, for that nine-day period, subject to limited 
exceptions, all New Zealanders were required by law to stay at home and 
in their “bubbles” when there was no such requirement. Those 
announcements had the effect of limiting certain rights and freedoms 
affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 including, in 
particular, the rights to freedom of movement, peaceful assembly and 
association. While there is no question that the requirement was a 
necessary, reasonable and proportionate response to the COVID-19 crisis 
at that time, the requirement was not prescribed by law and was therefore 
contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  
Notably, the Court chose not to spell out the crux of its declaration in plain language; 
that governmental actors (including the Prime Minister, Commissioner of Police, 
and Director General of Health) acted unlawfully during the early period of New 
Zealand’s Level 4 lockdown. Such reticence reflects the Court’s more general 
preparedness to recognise the exigencies under which these actors were operating 
(at [226]): “The situation lasted for nine days. And it occurred when New Zealand 
was in a state of a national emergency fighting a global pandemic. The Restrictive 
Measures could have been lawfully imposed had the Director-General’s [legislative 
powers] been exercised sooner – and he would have done so, if he thought it 
necessary.” For as the judgment’s opening paragraph opined (at [1]); “there is one 
thing on which most commentators are agreed. The decisions taken by the New 
Zealand government in March this year to ‘go hard and go early’ were the right 
ones”. 
Nevertheless, this declaration formally records the Court’s conclusion that for more 
than a week New Zealanders’ statutorily guaranteed rights and freedoms were 
limited without legal basis. In this comment we explain both why this was so, and 
why the Court was right to recognise that fact by way of a declaration. We also 
examine the Court’s finding that these limits did not constitute a suspension of either 
laws or their execution in terms of the Bill of Rights Act 1688. Finally, we suggest 
that the High Court missed an opportunity to clearly elucidate the constitutional 
limits on the executive’s power to promulgate apparently coercive directives in the 
absence of any legal authority. The impending appeal of the High Court’s judgment 
to the Court of Appeal perhaps provides an opportunity to revisit that last matter.  
 
The declaration in Borrowdale  
Borrowdale involved three challenges to the New Zealand Government’s actions in 
responding to COVID-19 by imposing so-called “level 4” and then “level 3” 
lockdown restrictions (for a full account of the case, see MB Rodriguez Ferrere, 
“Borrowdale v Director-General of Health: An unlawful but justified national 
lockdown”  (2020) 31(3) PLR (forthcoming). Two of these challenges were rejected by 
the High Court and so may be briefly recounted here, while also noting that the 
Court’s reasons for doing so have been critically examined elsewhere (see Claudia 
Geiringer and Andrew Geddis, “Judicial deference and emergency power: A 
perspective on Borrowdale v Director-General” (2020) 31(4) PLR (forthcoming)). The 
first failed challenge claimed that by requiring people to stay at home and isolate in 
their “bubbles”, the Director General of Health, Dr Ashley Bloomfield, acted ultra 
vires his powers under the Health Act 1956 (at [74]-[139]). The second failed 
challenge alleged an unlawful delegation from the Director General of Health to the 
Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment of the power to designate the 
“essential businesses” permitted to operate under levels 4 and 3 (at [242]-[279]). 
However, an additional challenge⎯that for the first nine days of the lockdown 
period New Zealanders had been instructed to stay at home and isolate in their 
“bubbles” without proper lawful authority⎯was successful. We focus on that aspect 
of the judgment here. 
In essence, Mr Borrowdale claimed that various public statements issued by the 
leaders of the Government’s COVID-19 response commanded New Zealanders, on 
pain of coercive consequences, to refrain from acting in ways that the law actually 
did not prohibit (the “Statements” – see [142]-[173]). Simply put, people were told 
they were forbidden by law to leave their houses except for very limited purposes, 
or meet with others outside their “bubbles” whether in public or private (the so-
called “Restrictive Measures” (at [174])), when, in fact, they were not ([191], [225]). 
That asserted gap between the official messaging and the legal basis for the 
lockdown’s first nine days arose because the original notice issued on 25 March 
under Health Act 1956, s70(1)(m) only “forbade people to congregate in outdoor 
places of amusement or recreation of any kind or description (whether public or 
private) in all districts of New Zealand, until further notice.” What is more, 
“congregating” had a restricted meaning that excluded “people maintaining at all 
times physical distancing”, which in turn meant “remaining two (2) metres away 
from other people, or if you are closer than two (2) metres, being there for less than 
15 minutes.” As such, all that the original Health Act notice actually prohibited was 
people remaining in close physical proximity to others in “outdoor places of 
amusement or recreation” for more than 15 minutes at a time. 
What, then, was the potential legal consequence of this asserted gap between the 
Restrictive Measures and the original Health Act order’s wording? The various 
leaders of the Government’s COVID-19 response all are members of the executive 
branch, and thus are bound by the NZBORA by virtue of s 3(a). As such, if their 
commands to the general public had the effect of causing individuals to believe they 
must stay in their homes and refrain from interacting with others on pain of legal 
penalty, their actions in issuing the Statements limited various rights guaranteed by 
the NZBORA (at [193]-[199]). In particular, the rights to freedom of expression (s 
14), manifest religion (s 15), peaceful assembly (s 16), freedom of association (s 17) 
and freedom of movement (s 18) were all implicated (at [87]-[89]). And as the Health 
Act notice did not, in fact, require people to comply with the Restrictive Measures, 
these rights were limited in a manner that was not “prescribed by law” (as required 
by the NZBORA, s 5).  
Such was Mr Borrowdale’s contention. In response, the Crown offered two 
somewhat contradictory rebuttals. The first sought to deny that the Statements at 
issue had actually “commanded” or “coerced” any action at all. They were instead 
merely “soft messaging” guidance (at [184]), seeking purely voluntary compliance 
from the general public to measures being suggested for public health reasons (at 
[194]). If people felt compelled to comply with this advice, that was due to a shared 
desire to defeat COVID-19 rather than a fear of coercive sanction from state 
authorities. However, the Court rightly was unpersuaded by this interpretation of 
events (at [180]-[192]).  Indeed, one suspects that the bench regarded the Crown’s 
argument as akin to legal gaslighting intended to convince them that their own 
memories of lockdown were faulty; “the Statements created the overwhelming 
impression that compliance was called for – indeed, that is how we interpreted them at the 
time.” (at [191], emphasis added.) 
The Crown’s second argument was that if the Statements in question were 
commands with coercive effect, their effect on individual rights actually was 
“prescribed by law”. Drawing on the Health Act’s silence as to how the Director 
General of Health must communicate requirements to the general public (at [122]-
[123]; [204]), the Crown argued that the Statements by the various leaders of the 
Government’s COVID-19 response were made in reliance on his advice (at [203]). 
As such, the commands issued by the Prime Minister, Police Commissioner, and 
others actually were Dr Bloomfield’s requirements, which he could lawfully impose on 
the populace under the Health Act, s 70(1)(f). Unfortunately, this claim ran counter 
to what Dr Bloomfield himself thought he had done at the time. A number of 
contemporaneous public statements, and his subsequent affidavit evidence, made it 
clear that he did not believe he had issued such requirements to the general 
population (at [209]-[214]). And as the Health Act does not allow for either the 
delegation or retrospective validation of such commands⎯the Director General of 
Health cannot rubber stamp his approval on requirements issued by others⎯his 
later agreement that such measures were necessary could not give them a basis in 
law (at [216]). 
The Crown also advanced an alternative argument that a patchwork of legal sources 
beyond the original Health Act notice meant the Restrictive Measures could lawfully 
be enforced, and so they were in fact “prescribed by law” (at [217]). However, that 
claim was belied by the Police’s understanding of their powers during the relevant 
9-day period as set out in the “Operational Policing Guidelines – Alert Level 4, 
Scenarios for the Frontline”, issued on 27 March (three days after the country 
entered level 4 lockdown). These Guidelines expressly noted that “people will still 
be capable of movement as long as that movement does not have the potential to 
further spread the virus”; while also noting that there was “no immediate 
enforcement power available” to curtail gatherings in private residences. After 
surveying the various enforcement powers that the Police understood were available 
to them during the first part of the lockdown, under the Health Act and Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (at [217]-[224]), the Court agreed with 
that assessment: “there was in fact no legal obligation for compliance with the 
Restrictive Measures.” (at [225]).  
For nine days, therefore, the commands issued by the various leaders of the 
Government’s COVID-19 response effectively limited the New Zealand public’s 
NZBORA rights without any legal basis. After those nine days, the Director General 
validly imposed the Restrictive Measures by way of requirements under the Health 
Act, s 70(1)(f). As the Court noted (at [226]), such s 70(1)(f) requirements could have 
been promulgated right from the beginning of the lockdown. Had the Director 
General done so, the Restrictive Measures would have been lawful throughout the 
lockdown period—and in any case, they represented quite reasonable measures in 
the face of COVID-19’s threat, which point Mr Borrowdale did not dispute ([237]). 
As such, the Court urged that its conclusion be “[kept] in perspective” (at [226]), 
with the question of whether to grant declaratory relief seen to be “finely balanced” 
(at [290]). However, a declaration ultimately was considered necessary as “in times 
of emergency the courts’ constitutional role in keeping a weather eye on the rule of 
law assumes particular importance” (at [291]). 
  
The Bill of Rights 1688 
We agree with the Court’s reasoning and its decision to issue a declaration, based as 
it is on quite straightforward Public Law principles. However, we also note that the 
declaration’s impact is very limited. The police’s already noted recognition that the 
proclaimed Restrictive Measures lacked a sound legal basis meant that during the 
lockdown’s first nine days few, if any, prosecutions were mounted for breaching 
them (at [217], f/n 94). And the Court’s explicit plea to keep its conclusion in 
perspective helped frame the government’s response to the judgment; that it had 
simply been “trying to educate people about the health risks and transition them 
quickly to take actions that curtailed normal freedoms like staying at home to stop 
the spread of the virus.”(Hon David Parker, “Attorney-General responds to Court 
judgment on legality of Health Orders”, Press release, 19 August 2020.) It may thus 
be tempting to write off the issuing of this declaration as something of a “no real 
harm, no real foul” situation. 
However, there are wider aspects to the Court’s decision that bear closer 
examination. In particular, the wider implications of its discussion of the Bill of 
Rights 1688 seem to us incompletely thought through. Mr Borrowdale had argued 
that the commands issued by the various leaders of the Government’s COVID-19 
response not only were inconsistent with the NZBORA, but had the effect of 
suspending that legislation’s operation (by suspending the operation of s 5 (see 
[234]), which requires the Act’s rights to be subject only to reasonable, demonstrably 
justified limits prescribed by law). This effect, Mr Borrowdale contended, breached 
the Bill of Rights 1688, Art. 1, in the same way as did Sir Robert Muldoon’s press 
release in the “tolerably well known” (at [231]) case of Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 
NZLR 615. However, the Court flatly rejected this contention. 
First, the Court found that the Statements in question did not “suspend” the 
NZBORA at all, as they “did not make or purport to make the requirements of s 5 
inoperable” (at [235]). The fact that the Statements contradicted s 5, limiting rights 
otherwise than by prescription of law, was insufficient to amount to a suspension of 
the section, as “[n]othing in the Statements suggested that s 5 had no continued 
application”. To “suspend” s 5, the Statements would have had to say something 
like “from now on, limits on rights can be effected by way of ministerial statement” 
([235]) – rather than simply being a ministerial statement with the (purported) effect 
of limiting rights. This reasoning views governmental commands that contradict 
existing law as an insufficient condition for its suspension. It is perhaps appropriate 
for more procedural law like s 5’s “prescribed by law” requirement, but should be 
applied with caution when the law asserted to have been suspended is substantive.  
In fact, Borrowdale itself can be viewed this way. The emphasis on s 5 seems to us to 
focus attention on the wrong place in the statute. What really became “inoperable” 
as a result of the commands was not the s 5 requirements, but the substantive rights 
guarantees themselves (indeed, the latter may have been the focus of Mr 
Borrowdale’s argument—compare [234] with [230(a)]). Being told to remain indoors 
and not meet with other people on pain of arrest effectively rendered “inoperable” 
the various statutorily guaranteed rights of movement, association and assembly. 
The absence of any lawful basis for those commands then meant s 5 was not 
available to justify these rights limits. The fact that the Statements did not explicitly 
rule out s 5’s operation, and that s 5 remained “operational” to justify other limits on 
rights makes no difference to the fact that, in the Court’s words, “the Statements … 
in effect, limited New Zealanders’ freedom of movement, assembly and association” 
([197]). As such, it seems hard to escape a conclusion that the executive in fact put 
an end to the effect of a parliamentary enactment, by stopping people exercising 
statutorily guaranteed rights without the necessary legal basis.  
Second, the Court found that the immediate case differed from Fitzgerald v Muldoon 
in that the executive could have lawfully limited the NZBORA rights (at [237]). 
Because the Court found that the Health Act 1956, s 70(1)(f) permitted the Director 
General to impose the Restrictive Measures from the lockdown’s very beginning (at 
[130]), there was no article 1 “suspension” of the law in commanding people to 
follow such requirements before their lawful imposition. Parliament’s constitutional 
monopoly on amending its own statutes was not threatened, as parliament had in 
fact authorised the possibility of such measures being imposed. And because the 
Court considered article 1 to be concerned solely with protecting parliament’s law-
making sovereignty against executive encroachment, it does not extend to cases 
where statutory mandates could be lawfully set aside by the executive (even if, in fact, 
they were not). 
That is a possible reading of article 1, but it is worth noting just how much it narrows 
the provision’s application. Had, for example, Robert Muldoon been able to halt 
payments into the superannuation fund by way of regulation, but instead chose to 
do so through issuing a press release telling employers to just stop making them, no 
article 1 issue would appear to arise. That press release would have had no legal 
effect. The public sector employers would still, in law, be required to make the 
payments. But the decision to issue the press release would not have been an unlawful 
suspension of law on the Borrowdale Court’s understanding of article 1, even if it had 
the consequence of causing public sector employers to stop complying with the law.  
 
Promulgation and the Bill of Rights 1688 
The Court also rejected, after brief consideration, the alternative argument made in 
reliance on article 1 of the Bill of Rights 1688—that the Statements, rather than 
unlawfully suspending existing law, amounted to the unlawful execution of laws (at 
[238]-[239]). Relying on article 1’s prohibition on “… the pretended power of 
suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of 
Parliament…”, Mr Borrowdale contended that the Statements were an unlawful 
“execution of laws” by amounting to their promulgation, without legislative authority. 
This argument failed because the Court considered that article 1 simply did not deal 
with the purported promulgation of law in this manner. Article 1, the Court held, 
prohibited the “pretended power of suspending … the execution of laws”; rather 
than simply the “execution of laws”. That is, this clause of article 1 prohibits 
suspending the operation of existing laws (legislation passed by Parliament – see [229]) 
by leaving them intact but impotent, rather than the promulgation of new laws.  
The Court cited three High Court authorities on this point (f/nn 102). Two were 
treated as appearing to interpret article 1 in the same way (Alan Johnston Sawmilling 
Ltd v Governor-General [2002] NZAR 129 (HC); Aviation Industry Association of New 
Zealand (Inc) v Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand HC Wellington CP289/00, 24 
August 2001 (HC)); and preferred over the third, which contemplated article 1 
involving both an “execution [of] laws” limit and a “suspending laws” limit 
(Professional Promotions & Services Ltd v Attorney-General [1990] 1 NZLR 501 (HC) at 
511). Even accepting this reasoning, it remains arguable, as discussed above, that the 
Statements did render “inoperable” various rights guarantees contained in the 
BORA (as opposed to s 5); leaving them intact, in a general sense, but impotent. 
Regardless, the significance that the Court attached to the executive’s ability to 
lawfully limit those rights using s 70(1)(f) suggests that no breach of article 1 would 
have been found. 
 
The underlying issue – the lawfulness of law-making by proclamation 
What appears to us of more interest, however, is that having dealt with the 
NZBORA and the 1688 Bill of Rights, the Court gives no further consideration to 
the common issue underpinning Mr Borrowdale’s challenges on both fronts—that 
the Statements promulgated substantive new law without legislative authority, and 
thus were unlawful. In essence, the promulgation challenge was to legislation by 
government proclamation; as implicitly recognised by the Court with its hypothetical 
example of a governmental proclamation forbidding attendance at church (at [198]). 
With article 1 held to be inapplicable on the promulgation point alone, the effect of 
the decision is to subsume this general issue within the narrower “prescribed by law” 
requirement in s 5 of the NZBORA.  
The problem with this emphasis is that it does not address the status of those 
common law rights and freedoms not included in Part 2 of the NZBORA. In 
particular, is it unlawful for the Prime Minister, Commissioner of Police, or similar 
to issue apparently directorial public commands without legal basis that people stop 
exercising such rights and freedoms? We suggest that it would have been preferable 
for the Court to make a clear general pronouncement about the limits on 
governmental power to legislate by proclamation, regardless of whether such a 
proclamation purports to limit statutes generally, the NZBORA specifically or 
common law. This need not turn on the interpretation of “execution of laws” in 
article 1 (i.e. reading it expansively as in Professional Promotions); but could draw on 
fundamental constitutional principles, including those expressed in the Case of 
Proclamations [1610] EWHC KB J22, 77 ER 1352, (1611) 12 Co Rep 74.  
Expanding on these points, it is clear that rights and freedoms may exist outside of 
or in combination with those affirmed in BORA (s 28). Indeed, the recent decision 
on the legislative ban on semi-automatic firearms (New Zealand Council of Licensed 
Firearms Owners Inc. v Minister of Police [2020] NZHC 1456) contains detailed 
discussion of the common law right to property, which is “…not one of those set 
out in NZBORA. But that does not mean it does not exist, or that it has a lower 
status.” (at [37]). Equally, in Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30; [2007] 3 NZLR 291 at 
[227], Thomas J opined that “the express omission of a right of privacy [from the 
NZBORA] should not inhibit the court from giving privacy the status of a right.” 
However, the reasoning in Borrowdale would not obviously cover a Ministerial 
statement affecting such judicially confirmed common law rights—such as 
purporting to ban a certain category of property. In the absence of any statutory 
guarantee for the property at issue, article 1 would not be engaged. Nor, apparently, 
would the “prescribed by law” requirement in s 5 of the BORA, which applies only 
to limits upon the rights and freedoms affirmed within Part 2 of the Act.   
Similarly, the ‘residual liberty’ at common law to do that which is not forbidden fits 
uneasily with Borrowdale’s emphasis on, and interpretation of, the Bill of Rights 
statutes. For article 1 to be applicable, the impugned conduct must affect a statute 
([229]). Article 1 cannot, then, apply to statements or proclamations that restrict this 
residual liberty—indeed, it necessarily begins where statutory law ends. As well, any 
statement that (wrongly) conveys there to be a legal prohibition on certain conduct, 
and which effects compliance (as the Statements did) will restrict this liberty. Yet, the 
effective finding of unlawfulness and the declaration made in Borrowdale turn on the 
further step of reframing the restrictions in terms of the BORA rights, in order to 
engage s 5.  
Perhaps it will be possible in many cases to carry out this reframing exercise. The 
rights and freedoms affirmed by the BORA are expressed widely.  The BORA rights 
may also overlap, sometimes substantially, with common law rights, as they do in 
the case of the rights declared in Borrowdale to have been limited contrary to statute.  
But the reframing exercise may be strained, and more importantly should not be 
necessary. The proposition that it is unlawful to purport to change what the law 
permits under the rubric of (Crown-derived) executive authority without a legal basis 
(i.e. be prescribed by law) does not rest on s 5 of the 1990 BORA, and is not 
restricted to limits on the rights and freedoms that Act contains. Indeed, it appears 
to us to be the core of the reasoning in the Case of Proclamations, which held unlawful 
an attempt by the Crown, through proclaiming offences, to alter the law of the land 
as no prerogative power is available to effect such an alteration (see e.g. the recent 
discussion of the case in R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General 
for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41 at [32], [41]).  
 
In Borrowdale, a similar attempt to alter the law of the land was made, through 
Ministerial and other Statements that purported to prohibit conduct formerly 
permitted, and which had a corresponding effect on behaviour. It seems to follow 
that unless another source of empowering authority can be identified, this attempt 
should also be held to be unlawful. This should be so regardless of s 5 of the BORA 
or the Bill of Rights 1688, in terms of which the Court’s findings were expressed 
given the specific challenges raised by Mr Borrowdale.  
 
It is not entirely clear, however, that Borrowdale supports this broader conclusion. 
Certainly, Borrowdale finds that for the first nine days, statute did not provide 
authority for the Statements’ prohibitions, although it could have done ([216]-[225]). 
Ordinarily, then, it might be expected that the common law would view the 
Statements as an affront to parliamentary sovereignty and not sanction them. What 
the tenor of the Court’s reasoning on the “suspending of laws” limb of article 1 
suggests, however, is that the mere availability of a statutory basis for the Statements 
dissolves the apparent tension with parliamentary sovereignty (see [229], [236]). 
Following this logic further, formal black letter requirements for law-making, such 
as for prescription by law in the BORA, become more, not less, important for a 
finding of unlawfulness.  
 
This seems to fixate overly on form over substance, as well as parliamentary 
supremacy over other matters of constitutional importance, such as the rule of law 
considerations which the Court expressly recognised as important throughout the 
decision. Put to one side nice questions of interpretation arising from 17th Century 
legal sources. The Statements took the form of apparent legal commands, including 
from the Prime Minister. They affected behaviour accordingly, limiting common law 
rights and freedoms together with those affirmed under the BORA. There was no 
legal authority for any of those limits, and they can therefore be properly considered 
as being unlawful. The Borrowdale decision may well be consistent with this 
perspective, but we suggest it could have been usefully articulated as part of the 
important constitutional role the High Court saw itself as filling (at [291]).  
 
Conclusion  
As alluded to in our introduction, the High Court’s dismissal of two of the causes of 
action has been appealed to the Court of Appeal. While that hearing’s main focus 
will be on the High Court’s rejection of these ultra vires and unlawful delegation 
challenges to the government’s actions, it also provides an opportunity to revisit its 
approach to the general lawfulness of the Statements inquestion. We do not think 
the Court’s declaration that these Statements were contrary to the NZBORA is 
wrong. However, we do think that the way the Court discusses those Statements—
and, in particular, any suggestion that the Statements were unlawful only because of 
inconsistency with the NZBORA—is regrettably deficient. While the NZBORA 
guards against executive actions that limit some affirmed rights without legal basis, 
it should not be regarded as the only such constitutional constraint. The exigencies 
of the litigation environment may help to explain the gaps in the Court’s decision 
that we have identified; in particular, the speed with which the case was heard and 
the desire to produce a quick judgment to provide certainty in an ongoing COVID 
environment. With the benefit of some greater opportunity for reflection, we hope 
that the Court of Appeal may be able to do better. 
